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Abstract: The paper investigates the effects of clime conditions on collected tax revenues, based 
on a panel-model approach. The data-set includes 123 countries and covers the period 1996-
2010. The main results show that the assumed function is linear, the clime conditions heaving a 
significant impact on collected tax revenues. Overall, the collected tax revenues tend to increase 
under cool, polar or boreal climate. The paper extends the literature in the field by focusing on 
the clime implications in economy and finds new evidences regarding the determinants of 
collected tax revenues. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
 
The modern government collects taxes and allocates them in order to fulfil his main 
constitutional goals, under an extended set of determinants, the clime being ignored a long period 
of time. Classical determinants of taxation are ordered by Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2008) in 
four categories: socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, marital status, education, 
employment status, religiosity and social class); political and social attitudes (trust in courts, the 
legal system, trust in politicians, democracy level, national pride, social capital, the perception of 
corruption and voting behaviour); fiscal parameters (tax rates, fine rate, audit probability, risk 
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aversion and personal income); and contextual determinants (extent of direct democracy, 
language fragmentation and existence of regional cleavages). 
It’s easy to see that the mentioned categories don’t take any geographical feature types into 
account. As Nordhaus (2006) shows, if the connections between economic phenomena or 
processes and geography is generally evident for quasi all persons, the modern macroeconomics 
ignore this linkage. Determinants such as climate conditions, water proxy, soils, pests and 
permafrost are practically ignored. According to the same author, there are two kinds of 
geophysical factors which can be used in economics studies: nonstochastic factors on the 
relevant time scale (latitude, distance from coastlines or elevation) and stochastic factors with 
slowly moving means and variability (climate conditions or soils). 
What happen with collected tax revenues under stochastic geophysical factors? Does clime 
influence the collected tax revenues? If yes, which is the magnitude of this impact? These 
aspects are very important because the clime could accelerate or decelerate the government tax 
revenue inputs. 
Regarding tax revenues under influence of clime conditions, the literature in the field is 
practically absent. Some results are obtained, but the analyses are focused on the clime impact on 
economic growth, economic development, revenues inequality, poverty, institutional quality or 
agricultural and industrial output. The pioneers in this topic are illustrious Montesquieu (1750) 
and Smith (1776), followed in contemporaneous period by Sachs and Warner (1997); Bloom and 
Sachs (1998); Gallup and Sachs (1999); Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999); Hall and Jones 
(1999); Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002); Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004); Sylwester (2004); Dell, Jones and Olken (2011) or Bansal and 
Ochoa (2012). 
In the contemporaneous period, Sachs and Warner (1997) investigate the growth in 23 
African countries, for the period 1965-1990, based on a cross-country regression model. The 
results show that the poor economic policies determine a slow economic growth, without any 
openness to international markets. Further, the authors add new determinants of slow growth: the 
lack of access to the sea and tropical climate conditions. One year later, Bloom and Sachs (1998) 
explore the influence of climatic conditions on some economic variables and emphasise that 
poorer zones are correlated with tropical climate, as results of tropical ecology effects on human 
health and agricultural productivity. The temperate clime is assimilated with the rich zones. 
Dell, Jones and Olken (2011) change the type of clime with temperature in their 
investigations. The authors study the effect of temperature’s fluctuations on economic activity, 
for a sample of 125 countries. The main conclusion shows that higher temperatures substantially 
reduce economic growth in poor countries. In parallel, they associate higher temperatures with 
reduced agricultural output, industrial output and political stability. More recently, Bansal and 
Ochoa (2012) investigate the connection between temperature, aggregate risk and expected 
returns, using a sample of 38 countries on the period 1960-2008. The researchers point out that 
temperature represents an aggregate risk factor of economic growth. In this respect, countries 
closer to the Equator reveal a positive temperature risk premium which decreases as one move 
farther away from the Equator. 
New evidences concerning “clime - economy” nexus reveal Gallup and Sachs (1999). They 
focus on the food production and find a strong correlation between food production and clime 
zone type. Through some inputs, such as capital, labour and fertilizers, the food production is 
very low in tropical zone, compared with temperate zone which registers high food production. 
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Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999) are more analytic, examining the connection between 
climate (ecozones), water navigability and economic development (GDP per capita) in the case 
of 152 countries, with a population of 1 million or more, in 1995. They emphasise that GDP per 
capita and density of economic activity (in GDP per km2) are high in temperate zone and in area 
proximate to the sea (within 100 km of the ocean or a sea-navigable waterway). 
Hall and Jones (1999) choose a new topic: the impact of clime on revenues inequality. The 
authors focus on the issues of per capita incomes discrepancy across nations and illustrate a 
strong correlation between geography (measured as distance from the equator) and per capita 
output by country. The location affects economic success because the position of human 
settlements can influence institutions. On the same topic, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) 
analyse the effects of location and climate on income levels and income growth. As a novelty, a 
set of control variables is used, such as: transport costs, disease burdens, agricultural 
productivity, among other channels. The main conclusion stresses that geography also affects 
economic policy choices. 
Other authors connect temperature, as independent variables, with some national 
characteristics, such as institutional quality (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; 
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004). Concretely, the results of Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi (2004) reveal that the institutions, geography and trade are the most important 
determinants of income levels around the world. More, geography is considered to have weak 
direct effects on income levels. Sylwester (2004) juxtaposes the history with geography as 
important stimulants pair of institutions and income. Using a cross-section of countries approach, 
he point out that only being landlocked has a strong influence on revenues inequality.  
Based on literature review, the aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of climate conditions 
on collected tax revenues, based on a panel-model approach. The data-set includes 123 countries 
and covers the period 1996-2010. We choose this extended world approach in order to capture all 
possible types of clime which should influence the tax revenues. As there is not any contribution 
in “clime-taxation” area, intuitively, at least two transmission channel could be identify: (i) first 
one, the direct impact of clime on tax revenues through taxpayers behaviour, and (ii) second one, 
the indirect influence of clime on tax revenues through some socio-economic variables or other 
indirect control determinants. 
The present paper extends the literature in the field by focusing on the clime implications in 
economy and finds new evidences regarding the determinants of collected tax revenues. The 
main results show that the assumed function is linear, the clime conditions heaving a significant 
impact on collected tax revenues. As a consequence, in this case, tax policy implications have 
major amplitude and complexity levels.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 highlights the methodology and data. 
Section 3 contains the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Methodology and data 
 
 
The clime’s tax implications are explored based on a large sample, determined by 123 cross-
sections (123 countries), from 1996 to 2010 (Table 1, in Appendix), using a panel-model 
approach. Even if the period seems to be relatively short, one of the advantages of panel models, 
according to Kennedy (2003), is that ”they can be used to analyze dynamics with only a short 
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time series”. More, the panel-models have the quality to capture the complexity of human 
behaviour than a single cross-section or time series data, as Hsiao (2007) notes.  
Two variables are selected in order to investigate the impact of clime conditions on collected 
tax revenues: tax revenues, as dependent variable, and a clime type variable, as independent 
interest variable. The dependent variable is represented by tax revenues (τ) and reveals the level 
of tax revenues collected by general government in U.S. dollars. The data is taken from the 
International Monetary Fund online data-base.  
The interest independent variable is clime type (δ) and represents a dummy variable. It is 1 if 
the clime is warm or tropical and 0 if the clime is cool, polar or boreal. The binary values of 
dummy variable are fixed according to IPCC’s (2006)1 clime zone types (Figure 1, in Appendix). 
The clime zones are characterised by four coordinates: annual mean daily temperature, total 
annual precipitation, total annual potential evapo-transpiration (PET), and elevation. Nordhaus 
(2006) argues that for this type of approach some geographic variables could be clearly 
endogenous (e.g., coastal density, proximity to markets, and health status). To avoid this 
endogeneity issue, we choose dummy type for interest variable, which capture quasi all clime 
zone characteristics. 
The principal hypothesis of this analysis is that the clime conditions determine the level of 
collected tax revenues, based on a function with this shape: 
 
)(δτ f= ,                                                                (1) 
 
where τ - the amount of tax revenues in U.S. dollars, and δ - the clime type dummy variable.  
The basic OLS naïv panel-model 1, with natural logarithmic of variable τ, is as follows: 
 
ititit εδβατ ++=  )ln( 0 ,                                                    (2) 
 
where α - intercept, β0 - slop of interest variable,  i - country, t - time and remainder, and itε  - the 
error term, which varies over both country, and time.  
We entered three categories of control variables: one inspired by appropriate tax literature, 
one derived from macroeconomic policy, and another one represented by robustness variables. 
Based on this correction, the extended linear model becomes: 
  
itti
n
k
itkkitit X ελµβδβατ +++++= ∑
=1
,0)ln( ,                                      (3) 
 
where α - intercept, β0 – coefficient of interest independent variable,  βk - coefficient of control 
independent variable k by n type, X - control independent variables, µi - stands for country fixed 
effects, λt - time-specific effect that controls for unaccounted common time-varying factors, i - 
country, t - time, and itε  - the error term.  
                                                            
1
 IPCC (2006) is the acronym for International Panel on Climate Change. According to www.ipcc.ch, IPCC was 
established by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate change and its 
potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. 
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The first group of control variables includes determinants from appropriate tax literature, such 
us: gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), size of industrial sector and size of 
agricultural sector. GDP per capita reveals the level of GDP in US dollars divided by midyear 
population and has a strong impact on tax revenues (e.g. Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005; Katircioglu, 
2010). The last two variables, size of industrial sector and size of agricultural sector, measure the 
value added by industrial/agricultural sector as percent in GDP. There are a lot of studies which 
explain their significant effects on collected tax revenues (e.g. Agbeyegbe at al., 2006). 
The second group of control determinants captures macroeconomic policy variables and 
includes: inflation rate, balance of trade, government debt, government final consumption 
expenditures and net foreign direct investments (FDI). The inflation rate is the percentage rate of 
change in consumer price level. Excellent contributions regarding the inflation - tax nexus are 
provided by Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977). Balance of trade measures the difference between 
monetary value of exports and imports of output in an economy, as percent of GDP. The balance 
of trade’s importance on tax revenues is illustrated by Rodrik (1998) and Gupta (2007). The third 
control variable is government debt, which shows the general government gross debt as percent 
of GDP. Battaglini and Coate (2008) reveal some evidences regarding the relationship between 
public debt and tax revenues. The fourth variable, government final consumption expenditures, 
quantifies the government final consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP and also has a 
strong impact on tax revenues, as Taha and Loganathan (2008) note. The last control determinant 
by macroeconomic policy origins is the net FDI. It captures the difference between inward 
foreign direct investment and outward foreign direct investment as percent of GDP. Notable 
researches regarding the implications of net FDI on tax revenues are performed by Mintz (1994), 
Richter and Wellisch (1996), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997, 2002), Wildasin and Wilson (1998), 
Wildasin (2003), or Huizinga and Nicodème (2006).   
The last group of control variables is for robustness and contains: government effectiveness, 
freedom from corruption, literacy index and democratization level. The government 
effectiveness captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies (-2.5 shows a weak governance performance, while 2.5 a strong governance 
performance one). The impact of government effectiveness on collected tax revenues is very 
strong (e.g. Hanousek and Palda, 2004; and Lisi, 2011). Freedom from corruption reveals the 
corruption intensity (the score 100 means low corruption, while a level of 0 indicates a very 
corrupt government). Corruption - tax revenues nexus is favourite topic for Ghura (1998); 
Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000); Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2001); or 
Imam and Jacobs (2007). Literacy index is the third control variable for robustness and indicates 
how many adults can read and write in a certain area or nation, as percent in total adult 
population. According to Kenney and Winer (2001) and Mahadavi (2008), this determinant is 
significant correlated with collected tax revenues. Finally, democratization level is captured by 
Polity2 index, with values from +10 (strongly democratic regime) to -10 (strongly autocratic 
regime). New investigations regarding the relationship between democratization level and tax 
revenues belong to Mutascu (2011). 
Table 2 in Appendix shows several descriptive statistics of used variables, while Table 3 
presents the source of data. All variables with strict positive values are treated as elasticity, 
except the inflation rate, balance of trade, government debt, net FDI, government effectiveness, 
and polity2.  
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The panel-data model may have heterogeneity in the data. As the investigated sample is 
unbalanced, we analyze this propriety only in the cases of fixed-effects models (the random 
effects panel-models are not consistent under unbalanced data-set). The hypothesis is tested 
using F-test, which permits to choose between pooled model and fixed-effects model. In this 
case, we consider all type of fixed-effects models: cross-section fixed-effects, period fixed-
effects and both kind of effects. In the following section we present the empirical results of 
considered function, following several econometric scenarios (models 1-7), as Table 4, in 
Appendix, illustrates. 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
 
The most important output shows that the interest variable “clime type” is significant and 
negative correlated with dependent variable - collected tax revenues - in all scenarios. In the 
panel OLS estimations, the control variables are significant, except the size of agricultural sector, 
inflation rate, literacy index and polity2. GDP per capita, size of industrial sector, balance of 
trade, government debt, government final consumption expenditures and government 
effectiveness are positive correlated with dependent variable, while the rest of significant 
explanatory variables have negative impact on tax revenues.  
Further, we initiate the hypothesis tests to choose between pooled model and fixed-effects 
model. The values of F-test and Chi-square for fixed-effects denote that the OLS estimations are 
preferred to the period fixed-effects model. Regarding the cross-section and both cross-section 
and period fixed-effects models, the results of F-test and Chi-square indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no heterogeneity is not rejected. In this case, the cross-section and both cross-
section and period fixed models are more appropriate than OLS panel models. For these kinds of 
models, the interest variable is also significant and negative correlated with tax revenues 
variable. The control variables GDP per capita, size of industrial sector, balance of trade and 
government effectiveness are significant and positive correlated with dependent variable (as 
exception, GDP per capita has negative sign for cross-section, and both cross-section and period 
fixed-effects model types). Otherwise, net FDI, freedom of corruption, literacy index and level of 
democratization have negative impact on tax revenues (the last two control variables are 
insignificant for the period fixed-effects model). These results confirm the main literature 
outputs regarding the sign of determinants for tax revenues, except the case of literacy index and 
politcy2 variables.     
  The empirical findings, in the case of 123 investigated countries, for the period 1996-2010, 
reveal that all considered control determinants have significant impact on collected tax revenues 
(except especially size of agricultural sector, inflation rate, government debt and government 
final consumption expenditures), but the main result shows that the interest variable is significant 
and negative correlated with dependent variable. In respect to clime dummy variable, the 
collected tax revenues tend to increase under cool, polar or boreal climate.  
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
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Tax revenues represent the main financial government resources. These revenues have 
several determinants by economic, socio-demographic and politic type. As the economic 
literature doesn’t take account by geographical conditions concerning tax revenues, our 
exploration demonstrates this new evidence, using clime zone conditions as main geographical 
determinant.  
The connection “tax revenues-clime” could have two principal transmission channels: one 
direct, and other indirect. The direct channel implies that the level of collected tax revenues 
depends by citizens’ behaviour, which differs from one clime zone to other. The indirect channel 
consists in impulse of clime conditions on tax revenues through a set of socio-economic 
determinants. In this case, even if the level of tax compliance is high, the amount of tax revenues 
is low as a consequence of weak economic power under clime conditions. 
The results reveal that only cool, polar or boreal climate can ensure a strong volume of 
collected tax revenues. There are two reasons in this way. On the one hand, in this type of clime 
the level of tax compliance is higher than the tax compliance registered by the temperate and 
tropical clime zone. The behaviour of taxpayers in this cool clime zone is characterised by 
honesty, pragmatism, and also great independence of character, individual initiative, and tenacity 
of will, as McDougall (2005) notes. On the other hand, the output confirms the contributions of 
Sachs and Warner (1997), and Bloom and Sachs (1998) regarding the connection “growth-
clime”. According to the authors, these two variables are generally low in the countries situated 
in warm clime zone. As a consequence, this means that cool, polar or boreal climate accelerates 
the tax revenues collection through the high level of economic growth.  
In the context of tax-policy implications, the study suggests that a significant increase of 
collected tax revenues, without a major negative reaction of taxpayers, can be easily obtained by 
public authority situated in cool, polar or boreal clime zone. Overall, these clime zones represent 
“the best environment for tax revenues”, accelerating the tax revenues collection. This study 
could be easily extended over tax burden - clime nexus, as result of particular state behaviour 
under different types of clime.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: List of analyzed countries 
 
Countries 
Albania Central African Rep. Germany 
Lao People's 
Dem.Rep Niger   Swaziland  
Algeria Chad    Ghana   Latvia  Nigeria Sweden 
Argentina Chile Greece Lebanon Norway Switzerland         
Armenia China,P.R.: Mainland Guatemala  Lesotho Oman    Tajikistan 
Australia           Colombia Guyana  Libya   Pakistan Togo    
Austria Costa Rica Honduras   Lithuania  Panama  Trinidad and Tobago 
Azerbaijan, 
Rep. of Croatia Hungary 
Macedonia, 
FYR Paraguay   Tunisia 
Bahrain, 
Kingdom of Cyprus  India Madagascar Peru Turkey 
Bangladesh Czech Republic Indonesia  Malawi  Philippines Uganda  
Belarus Denmark Iran, I.R. of Malaysia   Poland  Ukraine 
Belgium Djibouti   Ireland Mali    Portugal United Arab Emirates 
Benin   Dominican Republic Israel  Mauritius Qatar 
United 
Kingdom       
Bolivia Ecuador Italy Mexico Romania United States 
Botswana   Egypt   Jamaica Moldova Russian Federation Uruguay 
Brazil El Salvador         Japan   Mongolia   Rwanda  Uzbekistan 
Bulgaria   Estonia Jordan Morocco Saudi Arabia Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Burkina Faso        Ethiopia   Kazakhstan Mozambique Senegal Vietnam 
Burundi Fiji    Kenya   Nepal Slovak Republic     Zambia 
Cambodia   Finland Korea, Republic of Netherlands Slovenia 
Cameroon   France Kuwait New Zealand         Spain 
Canada  Georgia Kyrgyz Republic     Nicaragua  Sudan 
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Source: International Panel on Climate Change (1996), www.ipcc.ch 
 
 
Figure 1: Climate zone types 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Tax revenues (US dollars) 130183.3 12105.8 4784971 109.7 408090.6 1320 
GDP per capita (US dollars) 9508.193 2937.433 93156.84 91.65949 13997.93 1320 
Size of industrial sector as % of GDP 30.65618 29.03285 78.51812 10.68036 10.5007 1320 
Size of agricultural sector as % of GDP 14.42649 9.416252 59.72044 0.355229 13.16061 1320 
Inflation rate as % of GDP 6.103178 4.045315 85.74178 -9.863 6.887713 1320 
Balance of trade as % of GDP -4.519029 -2.59845 45.83854 -100.971 13.92318 1320 
General government gross debt  
as % of GDP 
 
52.62865 46.0935 235.596 0.55 33.66742 1320 
Government final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP 15.79292 15.74546 42.95028 2.675277 5.697811 1320 
Net FDI as percent of GDP 2.500696 1.957294 46.50057 -22.7899 4.598441 1320 
Government effectiveness 0.190568 -0.05 2.34 -1.62 0.958409 1320 
Freedom of corruption 43.03561 35 100 10 23.05614 1320 
Literacy index 0.867955 0.944432 1 0.083162 0.185077 1320 
Polity2 index 5.016667 8 10 -10 6.046173 1320 
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Table 3: Source of data 
 
Variable Source 
Tax revenues (US dollars) International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
GDP per capita (US dollars) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) online data-base (2011). 
Size of industrial sector as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Size of agricultural sector as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Inflation rate as % of GDP International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
Balance of trade as % of GDP International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
General government gross debt as % of 
GDP International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
Government final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Net FDI United Nations Development Programme online data-base (2011). 
Government effectiveness World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Freedom of corruption The Heritage Foundation online data-base (2012). 
Literacy index 
United Nations Development Programme online data-
base (2011). 
 
Polity2 index Polity™ IV Project Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2010 Dataset (2011). 
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Table 4: Empirical results of panel regressions 
 
 
Dependent variable: ln tax revenues ($) 
Independent variables Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
constant 10.647*** 
(0.038) 
-1.119** 
(0.472) 
0.7655 
(1.072) 
2.586*** 
(0.978) 
2.892*** 
(0.473) 
2.632*** 
(0.985) 
2.806***  
(0.446) 
clime dummy 
-1.877*** 
(0.038) 
-0.068*** 
(0.024) 
-0.1809*** 
(0.048) 
-0.114** 
(0.046) 
-0.476*** 
(0.145) 
-0.114** 
(0.047) 
-0.476*** 
(0.001) 
ln GDP per capita 
  
1.005*** 
(0.04) 
0.926*** 
(0.072) 
0.84*** 
(0.079) 
1.124*** 
(0.06) 
0.839*** 
(0.08) 
1.123*** 
(0.061) 
ln size of industrial as % of GDP 
  
0.76*** 
(0.069) 
0.259** 
(0.104) 
0.531*** 
(0.095) 
-0.281** 
(0.116) 
0.539*** 
(0.096) 
-0.247**  
(0.105) 
ln size of agricultural as % of 
GDP   
-0.088 
(0.06) 
-0.021 
(0.118) 
-0.046  
(0.107) 
0.07  
(0.086) 
-0.049 
 (0.107) 
0.072  
(0.088) 
inflation rate (%) 
    
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006  
(0.005) 
-0.005 
 (0.003) 
0.006  
(0.005) 
-0.005  
(0.003) 
balance of trade as % of GDP 
    
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
0.0007*** 
(0.001) 
ln general government gross debt 
as % of GDP     
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.004 
 (0.001) 
0.0007  
(0.0008) 
ln government final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP 
 
    
0.108** 
(0.054) 
0.104* 
(0.054) 
0.048  
(0.127) 
0.099*  
(0.056) 
0.053  
(0.129) 
net FDI as % in GDP 
      
-0.043*** 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.007) 
-0.044*** 
(0.006) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
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government effectiveness 
      
0.458*** 
(0.054) 
0.452*** 
(0.054) 
0.463*** 
(0.054) 
0.46*** 
 (0.052) 
ln freedom of corruption 
      
-0.569*** 
(0.064) 
-0.413*** 
(0.099) 
-0.579*** 
(0.065) 
-0.425*** 
(0.098) 
ln literacy index 
      
-0.149  
(0.14) 
-0.76*** 
(0.139) 
-0.142  
(0.14) 
-0.142*** 
(0.141) 
polity2 index 
      
0.0006 
(0.007) 
-0.036*** 
(0.006) 
0.0003  
(0.007) 
-0.037*** 
(0.006) 
Type of estimation PLS PLS PLS PLS PLS (FE:CS) 
PLS 
(FE:PE) 
PLS 
(FE and PE) 
Model summary 
R-squared 0.126 0.608 0.641 0.651 0.878 0.652 0.878 
F-test for fixed effects     20.1 
(0.0000) 
0.24 
(0.9987) 
17.72 
(0.0000) 
 
Chi-square     1429.1 
(0.0000) 
3.68 
(0.9986) 
1437.6 
(0.0000) 
(a) (…) denotes the standard error. 
(b) PLS represents panel least squares. 
(c) FE:CS and FE:PE denote cross-section fixed-effects, respectively period fixed-effects.  
(d) ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. 
 
